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Danila Ioan MarianExplanation of cognition in Cognitive Science A revie of Vacariu et als explanation of cognition involved in Toard a very idea of representationABSTRACT. In this article I reproduce and examine some aspects of Vacariu et al explanation of cognition. I conclude that their explanation of cognition is not a complete one. I try to propose some alternative explanations toard a complete explanation of every posible cognition and to emphasize that the task of philosophy, as discipline included in Cognitive Science, is to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of every posible cognition. In final, I try to criticize the idea that cognition can be only representational. There is a cognitive arhitecture ith a hierarchy of levels of existence. Vacariu et al has considered that cognition cannot be explanated by a single level. Arguments -the emergency of the primitives of one level from the primitives of previous level.- bidirectionality of cognitive processes bidirectionality, ich is for Vacariu et al one of the most important ideas, is the continuous circular causation ich exist beteen conceptual and neural levels the changes ich appear at the conceptual level involve changes at neural level and vice-versa. Because of bidirectionality it is imposible to be explanated cognition using a single level, either by conceptual level like Fodor or by neural level as Churchlands. But as has been sad previous, there is a cognitive arhitecture, and the conceptual level must to belong to its levels of existence, not to some metaphysical level. In the case of human cognitive arhitecture hat is the diference beteen neural and conceptual levels In this case CNS must to be seen in levels. Its loer neuronal level maybe is the singular neuron level. Than, conceptual level must be situated, in acord ith Vacariu et al, at higher level of compositionality and activity. But, there is no clear evidence that Churchlands ould be reduced the conceptual level until at the singular neuron level.The level of description that is proper to symbolic paradigm is conceptual descriptive entities are simultaneous semantic symbolsthey refers to external objects and syntactical symbolsoperations on the representations are manipulations of symbols. The level of description that is proper to conectionist paradigmcf.Smolensky is subconceptual its descriptive entities are caled subsymbols because they are the constituents of the symbols proper to symbolic paradigm. Hoever, operations are considered differently subsymbols are manipulated by numerical computationsvectorial additions in a vectorial space of activation. Vacariu et al noted that maybe in one day, Churchlands eliminativism, ich reduce the conceptual level at the neural level, ill in but, the neural level can be eliminated in the favour of cuantic level. Fodor and Phylysyn consider that conceptual level cannnot be reduced at the neural level, because of representational character of mental symbols.The representational character of mental symbols is an argument against the reductionist program of theoretical unity of scienceFodor and Phylysyn, 1988. I think that, there must be a mereologycal dependence beteen levels and beteen the primitives at the every level. But, this dependece does not mean necesarly that the events from a higeher level emerge as mereological sums of the events from the loer levels.Organization is a property ich cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on those of the others and on the aims of the holeDel Re, 1998. For exemple, if e take one thousand of resistors and e try to conect them in all posibile structures, e kno that there is only one structure, ich is total serial, in ich the total resistance, the event from higher level, is the individual resistors resistances sum, or the mereological sum of loer level events properties, but in structures that involve paralel connected resistors, the total resistance is not a simple sum of individual resistors resistance. As a kind of conclusion, human neurons are not miniatural human brains.At each level of analysisexplanation there are some primitives. At the conceptual level the primitives are symbolic representations ich are static and discrete. Contraparts of symbolic representations at the neural level are the neurons activation paterns, but the corespondence beteen the primitives of conceptual level and those of neural level is not biunivoc. ...the structures from the higher levels of sistem are rarely isomorphic, or even similar, to the structures of loer levels of sistem Fodor and Pylysyn 1988, 63. Activations paterns are in permanent motion and change. At the subconceptual level the primitives are subsimbolic representations, and their content depend on the netorks processing capacities and on the environment in ich it operate. The relation beteen conceptual and neural levelsMerzenich and deCharms speaking about neural representations, affirm that there is a representational perceptual costancy even at the neural level, the activation pattern of the ensemble of neurons---from ich emerge the perceptual representation--- is in continuos motion and change. Representational relations beteen neural elements of a grup can be isomorphic over the changes of activation patterns ... and therefore they can realize representational constancyMerzenich and deCarms 1996,66. Extending this idea Vacariu et al considered that at the conceptual level e can speak of a representational constancy even if the ensemble of neurons that corespond to it are in continuous changing. Representations of conceptual level approximates the processes from the neural level the stability from conceptual level is the result of this approximation. But I think that this stability about ich discuss Vacariu et al is a relative one it is rather a question of speed of motion, at least at the level of the flux of thoughts even at level of contents of single concepts there are sometimes historical changes. Hoever, Vacariu et al stability is relative to some loer faster changes. The rate of changes of those to flux of changes is different. The changes at neural level are continuos, but there is a threshold of changing hen this threshold is exceeded some modifications of representations from the conceptual level appear. For exemple, in connectionism, excitation or inhibition of a knot depend on the signals ich are recepted from other knots and, there is a threshold of the activation function. If the value of a recepted signal is biger than the value of threshlod function than the knot is activated, if no it is inhibated. The activation state of a unity is determined by the total input of this unity, relation beteen knots being more important than unities taken separately. Vacariu et al consider that our cognitive sistem and even our senses are determined by the our ecological recess. For exempl...
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