... philosophy is a knoledge, differences appear either concerning its object first principles, the absolute, the universal etc. or its method by concepts to Kant or its facultyreason, senses etc. But, is philosophy limited just to a form of contemplative knoledge disinterested from a practical or applicative point of vie Tudosescu considers that...only in limits in hich it conditionate value reedifications at the level of other forms of social conscience and, respective, modifications in the structure of the tables of cultural values, so that these to stimulate changes hith deep character in the structure and dynamics of civilizations, e can say that philosophy have an applicative characterTudosescu 1997, p.169. Someones had emphasized the propensity toards universality, the tendency to cover the hole reality philosophy is a general conception about the orld it tries to discern the most general determinations of reality, that is of nature, society and thinking. But, neither thought is an universal characteristic of univers nor society. The most general determinations of orld concern either the fundamental-necessary level of reality, substance, microphysics level, or some characteristics of the univers as a hole, like evolution or cosmic becoming. Others considered that, philosophy studies existence in its totality . But Beaufret have ritten about ollfollf is proposing for himself therefore to make the census of essentialias, that is of all that it can be said about being as being. This science is, by consequence, the science of being as posibility....One can talk about being ithout to say a ord about its existence. The last is just a complementum posibilitatis, a complement of posibility.Beaufret 1998, p.11. On the other hand, there are special philosophies, as ethics or ethical philosophy, hich are quasi-disinterested about some ontic or ontological aspects of reality. There is some autonomy beteen some philosophical disciplines, such as there is a certain freedom in human life. An alternative characterization of philosophy concerns its aims. Thus, for Rescher the characteristic aims of philosophy are i Provide ansers to those domain definitive questions, that is, propound and comunicate information that conveys these ansers . e ant ansers. ii Seek for cogency, that is, fit those ansers out ith a rationale that attains cogency and conviction by ay of evidentiation, substantiation, and demonstration. e ant not just ansers but ansers orthy of acceptance. iii Strive for rational economy, pursuing the tasks at issue in points i and ii in a ay that is rationally satisfacatory, that is, in an efficient, effective, economical ...The general characterization problem of philosophy relative to its particular domains or of its specific relative to other cultural forms---art, religion, science---is a metaphilosophical one. But, ho it can be justified this diversity of opinions about the esence of philosophy Coltescu had considered that The to levels of philosophy, ifirst-order philosophy and metaphilosophys are in interaction, are situated in a circularity raport, the thinkers options in the plane of proper philosophy having effects on their metaphilosophical conceptions and, converse, their metaphilosophical conceptions influence their investigations in the plane of proper philosohy.Coltescu, 2002, p.18-19. About the antireduction of philosophy, science, mind and imortalityLike Vacariu et al 2001, p.275, I consider that the previous characterizations are partly correct but they concern philosophy from a single perspective, sometimes from a reductionist point of vie. They can be considered as quasi-complementary. Hoever, previous characterizations, either in particular or taken all together simultaneouslly, do not succed to surprise all that as, all that is, all that ill be, all that can be philosophy. But, until to hat limits can be philosophy extended and developed hat is philosophy Or, can be it unificated If an unification by reduction at one of the previous characterizations is inacceptable, still remain a posibility of unification not by reduction but by an ultimate persistent aim, ideal. I ill ilustrate this ith an example from philosophy of science. Popper considered that truth is the regulative ideal of science, and in this sense truth may have an unificatory role, relative to various special sciences, as a common aim, ideal, tack toard all the scientific propensities converge. But, truth single maybe is a too strong criterion of scientificity and is not enough as an ideal of science, because the common statements as the sun is brilliant are not veritable scientific statements, because they are too common-truths. More constrains are needed. In addition, science should to pursue also sistematic explanation, the las and the freedom grades of universe at all its levels, from microcosmos to individual human conscience, society and macrocosmos.Against antistructural reductionism Fetzer assume that science aims at the discovery of las of nature that have the form of general principles that are applicabile for the purposes of explanation and prediction. On the other hand, science should not to prefere simplicity and economy necessarly. Simpler theories ought to be prefered to complex alternatives only in the cases in ich they are also adequate, truth. I addition, e do not kno a priori that reality is simple. Other think that, science tend toards unitycf. Gold and Stoljar, 1999. Hoever, science should to pursue unity only in the case in ich orld is realy unitary. But, e do not kno a priori that universe have an ultimate universal unity. This aims are preferable but they are contingent aims, thereby they have a contingent scientific value. Maybe, the universe have a fundamental ontological level ich have a necessary existence, and consequently is universal, forin every posible orld, but the universe unity should not be identified ith the unity of science. The unity of universe exist at the fundamental ontological level, but the unity of human science is at the level of human conscious level. The human consciousness is something that exist at an upper ontological level, that depend on a more complex level of organization. If the elementary particles are not elementary, if there exist an ultimate unique-type-of-ontological-primitive, hoever, organization is a property ich cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on those of the others and on the aims of the hole.Del Re, 1998. By previous phrase I have not intentioned to defend the autonomy of chemistry, biology or of psychology against microphysicss imperialism. I only intended to criticize the tendency to reduce all the emergent properties of systems ith complex organization to the sums of the properties of their microparts. I disageed hith idea that all the phenomena from superior organizational complexity levels supervene as simple sums of the phenomena from loer levels. The...
Download