...e believe that this concept can capture the aspects of connectionst representations ich can not be isolated, each computing unit being involved in representing several things.In the case of dynamical systems theory maybe it is improper to talk effectively about the notion of representation. But e can identify some structures that are preserved through the continuous changing ithin the state space.Vacariu et al. 2001, 291.I ill propose a content as the content of the very idea of representation and I ill compare the previous three idea ith my idea. For Edelman, representation is not similar ith something from environment, but it present similarities beteen cognitive or conscious contentsinformations.A representation is a certain stored information ich stands-in for something, its function being that of carrying specific information. Hoever, the bear existence of a correlation beteen a certain inner state and some bodily or outer parameters is not enough to establish the representational status of that inner state, more important being the nature and the complexity of correlationClark 1997 cf.Vacariu et al.2001.I think that, there must be first order conscious states. Even if perception is not independent of previous experience. At least temporally, first order conscious informations must to exist. Re-presentation is, therefore, a stored conscious information. That is hy, in this conception, representational flo cannot be first order conscious informations flo. The conscious first order flo is the fundamental matter of cognition. Representational capacity-Store capacityRecall capacityRc-ScRCc By the help of store capacity and recall capacity e can represent some of the previous conscious contentsinformations both of first order and 1x order.There are people that concentrate their atention on the study of human visual system, because they had supposed that cognitive process advance in the foloing ayvision, perception, ideacognitionorIdea-perception-visionHoever, I think that the first order conscious material of cognition come from all sensorial system, not only from visual system. On the other hand, is the idea of atom, or that of quanta, just a simple representationHumans arrived at this ideas after hundreds and sometime thounsands of years of recalls, ne experiments and free processing. And, no ill be reduced all this ideas to the very idea of representationIt is clear that, in the actual scientific cognition e does not start only ith pure perception, but also ith the fundamental theories and ideas ich e gained until no. e do not start again from 0.The idea of re-presentation is a compose ideait suggest a subjective temporal parameterpresenttimeand a recurrsive phenomenon.Maybe, in some point of the interval of cosmic evolution many events are repeated ithout of our cognition about them.It can be suitable for non-cognitive physical events. No, given this to characteristics ofthe very idea of representation e find thatthis idea is not covered by the idea of a structual or formal equivalence.hat this idea suggest is not primarly a similarity, as said Edelman.this idea does not involve the objective aspect of mental representationsBook 1999, though I agreed that cognitiv states or flo had something ojective.this idea does not imply something cognitive.this idea does not imply specially a complex correlation, as considered Clark. All the very idea of representation contain is the temporal-repetition of something ich is identic non-temporally. The present from re-presentation is only a guiding referencemark of time of change.The same physical type cause, in the same contextual conditions, ill alays give rise to the same type of efects.Representationalthingdo not imply MentalthingorRxdo not-MxIs all the human ideas representational No.Argument e can form ne individual notions or ideas. This ideas do not result by abstraction of the general features or characteristics from a temporally previous set-category of notions or first order conscious contents. For exemple, hen an designer imagine a ne race car, he create a nenon-representational individual idea. Of course, he use something from its previous experience as material, but the ne idea or image, as a hole, is not a re-presentation. Much more, he can imagine a car that does not asemble ith any previous car.On the other hand, appear a ne posibilitye can have similar first order conscious mental contents.Thus, it seems that a re-presentation can occur even at the level of first order conscious flo. But, this representation is not of the same individual stimulus, but only of the same type of stimulus. Only memory can give a re-presentation of the same individual conscious content.Identity is an idea ich involve indistighuisability.On the other hand, identity can be absolute or relative.The idea of representation involve only a relative identity, because suggest a temporal difference.That is hy the idea of representation involve a temporal non-identity.From a physical point of consideration hat is identic in univers is some forms.For exemple, there are hidrogen atoms but they are not composed by the same physical particles, but only by the same type of physical particles.That is, some physical processes and some physical structures may have a general-form identity.A re-presentation is something that can occur both at physical abiogen level and at the cognitive level of univers, but my fundamental idea isthere can be no an absolute re-presentation of an instant of time.There are peoplemaybe Stefanescu ich consider that the study of visual system is the most important to understanding mental representations.I think that, at least first order visual representations cannot exist, because the absolute first order visual conscious contents are not re-presentations. Brains representations have as a condition of posibility a recognition of an identic content or the poer to store and recall conscious contents.if e cut the connection beteen first order conscious contents and stored contents e can no detect the identity beteen their type that is, a first order visual conscious contentinformation can be a re-presentation only relative to some stored information.On the one hand, if the same brains areas are used in creative imagination, hoever, this imagination is not pure representational, on the other hand, this imagination is not first order vision. In addition, there can be non-visual re-presentations. The conditions of the posibility of the cognitive re-presentations arethe capacity of having actual conscious contents.the capacity of store conscious contents.the capacity of recall the stored or coded conscious contents.No, I return to the first ideas selected by Vacariu et al. to see if they fit the very idea the representation.Soyers idea mean an isomorphism beteen something physical and something cognitive. First, e see that this idea is too narro, because the very idea of representation not involve only cognition.Seccon...
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